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We study the e¤ect that the care decision process has on the amount of
caring-time and on informal caregiver satisfaction. We develop a theoretical
framework in which we compare three two-stage sequential games, each of which
corresponds to a di¤erent care decision (family, caregiver, and recipient). We
nd cases of overprovision of informal care in both the family and the recipient
decision models, since the caregiver is obliged to spend more time than he/she
would prefer. We then use the Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the
Elderly (2004) to study the relationship between the care decision processes
and the time that informal caregivers devote to care activities, with the results
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rming our theoretical hypotheses. We also nd that di¤erent care deci-
sion processes imply di¤erences in the informal caregivers satisfaction, with
intensive caregivers being less likely to have greater satisfaction.
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1 Introduction
The dependent population in 2000 comprised 4-5% of the global population, or 7-8%
of the population of working-age. In developed countries, the number of dependent
people is expected to increase, on average, by 31% by 2040, with this increase being up
to 20% in Europe and Japan, and 60% in North America and Australasia (Harwood
et al. 2004). This process will increase the demand for informal and formal care
for the disabled population, with this increase being the result of growth in the
proportion of elderly people during the last 30 years, and of changes in the health
needs of the population, with noncommunicable diseases, mental illness and injuries
becoming leading causes of disability (World Health Organization, 1999).
Simultaneously, female labour force participation has increased and family pat-
terns have changed as a result of lower marriage rates, higher divorce rates and
declining fertility. The growth in female labour force participation began in the
Nordic countries and in the United States, reaching a level of 80% of women aged
25-54 in 2001, with this being later extended to other countries, where the participa-
tion rates of women aged 25-54 are about 60% in Mexico, Turkey and the majority
of Southern European countries (OECD Labour Market Statistics). These changes
have given rise to concerns about the future viability of a care pattern which relies on
informal care. However, full-time workers have maintained or increased their e¤orts
as primary caregivers (Spillman and Pezzin, 2000), which raises questions about the
motivations of these individuals.
On the other hand, policy makers in some developed countries prefer that care
for the sick and the elderly takes place "in the community", which is reliant on
home-based care, following the recommendation of the World Health Organization,
as opposed to "in an institution", to diminish the impact on social welfare provision.
For instance, in Great Britain, there is an increased concern about the link between
engaging in care and labour force participation, and a focus on developing policies
to encourage exible schedules (Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Heitmueller, 2007).
In the USA, public policies are designed to support informal care (Van Houtven and
Norton, 2004), and in Canada, public home care expenditure has increased (Stabile
et al., 2006), with a growing concern about the relationship between formal and
informal care.
In this paper, we examine how care arrangements a¤ect informal caring-time and
the caregivers level of satisfaction. In our theoretical approach, we develop, under
di¤erent care arrangements, three two-stage sequential games to capture the range
of interactions between care recipients and informal caregivers, and we nd cases of
overprovision of informal care in both the family decision model and the care recipient
decision model. In the rst case, the informal caregiver can receive compensation,
with this taking the form of an increase in the fraction of residual non-labour income
allocated to the informal caregiver. In the second case, the care recipient decides
the optimum informal caring-time, which, being considered as free, does not a¤ect
his/her budget constraint, and thus may result in the time demanded by the care
recipient generating Pareto inferior solutions.
We then empirically study the impact of care decision processes on informal
caring-time, and analyse changes in the informal caregivers satisfaction, using the
Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly 2004 (Encuesta de Apoyo In-
formal a los Mayores). The issue is of relevance in developed countries, and more
specically so in Spain, where the number of people requiring care has grown at an
unprecedented rate. According to the Institute for the Elderly and Social Services
(Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales), there were about 1 million informal care-
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givers in Spain, representing 6% of the population aged 18 or older, in 2004, and
the number of elderly recipients of informal care is estimated at 1.3 million, 17% of
the population aged 65 or older. This Spanish Survey specically includes a ques-
tion asking why informal caregivers engage in informal care activities, di¤erentiating
between the caregivers own decision, a family decision and a recipient decision.1
We nd that informal caregivers devote more time to care activities when they
are obliged to. The family decision has the largest e¤ect on the selection of di¤er-
ent amounts of caring-time. However, the care recipient decision has no signicant
impact.
The informal caregivers decisions about whether to spend time caring for the
elderly or the sick depend, in part, upon the informal caregivers subjective evaluation
of their current status. It is not always clear how, and by whom, informal care should
be valued: the care recipient, the informal caregiver, or others. Registering changes
in the well-being of informal caregivers constitutes a rst source of evaluation. Our
results show that being obligated to care, by way of the family decision, decreases
the probability of being more satised, with the losses of satisfaction being greater
for intensive informal caregivers.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the literature regarding
the provision of informal care and household decision-making. Section 3 develops
the theoretical framework. Section 4 presents the data used in the analysis. Section
5 shows our ndings on informal caring-time, and Section 6 focuses on informal
caregiverssatisfaction. Section 7 sets out our conclusions.
2 Literature
Even though informal care supply is relevant to all developed countries, existing
research on this topic refers mainly to the US and the UK. Most of these studies
analyse the inuence of informal care responsibilities on the labour supply of in-
formal caregivers, relative to non-caregivers, with the general conclusion being that
informal caregivers are potentially more exposed to labour market disadvantage (see
Carmichael and Charles, 1998, 2003; Heitmueller, 2007: Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007;
Checkovic and Stern, 2002; Stern, 1995). As a consequence, the empirical literature
is focused on studying the endogeneity of the caring decision with respect to labour
market participation. As Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) ask "do caregivers choose
to work fewer hours or do part time workers choose to provide informal care?".
Carmichael and Charles (1998, 2003) and Barmby and Charles (1992) consider the
provision of informal care to be an exogenous factor in the labour supply decision,
since it is not possible to predict the state of dependency. Ettner (1995, 1996) and
Stern (1995) use an instrumental variable approach to consider the potential endo-
geneity of informal care on the labour supply of women. Heitmueller (2007) shows
that caring and labour market participation may be endogenous, and that not ac-
counting for this endogeneity can overestimate the impact that care responsibilities
have on the labour market decisions of caregivers.
With respect to the theoretical background, several papers focus on analyzing the
di¤erent ways of modeling the care decision-making process, examining which family
members participate in the decision-making process, and which types of care and/or
living arrangements are considered, by analyzing parent-child relationships in which
1Other Surveys, such as the HRS (Health and Retirement Study), do not include questions
related to this issue. The SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) does
include some questions about the reasons, if any, caregivers engage in such activities, but only
accounts for the di¤erence between the caregivers own decision (to meet other people, to contribute
something useful, for personal achievement,...), and the caregivers sense of obligation.
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only one child is considered in the decision-making process (see, for the case of living
care arrangements, Kotliko¤ and Morris, 1990).
Others papers extend this framework, considering that several family members,
such as all children, play a role in care decisions (see Engers and Stern, 2002; Check-
ovich and Stern, 2002; Pezzin et al. 2007). More recent work has used game-theoretic
bargaining models to examine family care arrangements, which involve separate util-
ity functions for each family member. Pezzin and Schone (1999, 2002) assume that
intrahousehold allocation is determined as the solution to a cooperative Nash bar-
gaining game, in which the threat point is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a nonco-
operative game. Hiedemann and Stern (1999) and Engers and Stern (2002) develop
game theoretic models of family bargaining to analyse long-term care. In this sense,
Pezzin and Schone (1997) and Pezzin, et al. (2007) nd that incentives exist for
family members to behave in a strategic manner.
Thus, care decisions are often the result of numerous individual and joint deci-
sions by family members (Heitmueller, 2007), which justies the study of the family
decision-making process, when considering that "one model cannot capture all pos-
sible aspects of a familys long-term care and living arrangements" (Hiedemann and
Stern, 1999). However, it is not well established whether care arrangements should
be modeled as a cooperative or a noncooperative game. Modeling interactions as a
cooperative game allows us to obtain Pareto e¢ cient outcomes, without specifying
the rules of the game. On the other hand, noncooperative game theory assumes
that the rules of the game are often crucial determinants of the outcome, in that the
sequence of moves and the information available to each player at each move a¤ects
the game equilibrium. As Pezzin et al. (2007) stress, this kind of social interaction
is di¢ cult to model, since it is "complex, and loosely structured", with the modeling
of family interactions as cooperative or noncooperative being a "research strategy".
3 The Framework
Given that our purpose is to analyse how informal caring-time depends on how the
informal care decision process takes place, we capture di¤erent interactions between
care recipients and informal caregivers by considering three care decision models,
with three participants: a disabled person and two potential caregivers.2 In each of
these models, we perform interactions as a two-stage game. Both stages may contain
substages, for instance, living arrangements, although the analysis of these substages
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The rst stage of the game determines the optimum hours spent caring for dis-
abled individuals. In the rst model, the care recipient decides the hours that the
caregiver devotes to care activities, Care Recipient Decision. In the second model,
we consider that the caregiver takes the decision on his/her own, Informal caregiver
Decision. Finally, in the third model, the care arrangement is obtained by way of a
family decision, Family Decision. In the second stage of each of the three games, we
determine the optimum behaviour of the other agents, and determine the resource
allocation under each arrangement structure (see Table 1). These three two-stage
sequential games are solved by backward induction.
2We do not study how families make decisions. This was analysed by Hiedemann and Stern
(1999) using a strategic model of bargaining to determine how to care for an elderly parent.
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Table 1: Care Decision Processes
First Stage Second Stage
Process 1. Care Recipient Decision Care Recipient Potential Caregivers
Process 2. Informal Caregiver Decision Potential Caregivers Care Recipient
Process 3. Family Decision Potential Caregivers Care Recipient
Note: Agents involve in each stage of the Care Decision Processes.
We use the subscripts f1; 2; 3g to indicate the decision process, and the subscripts
fr;m1;m2g to indicate the care recipient, r, and the potential caregivers, fm1;m2g,
respectively. Thus, Cr;1 denotes private consumption by the recipient when the
recipient is the one who decides the hours that the caregiver spends.
To construct the decision process, we begin by specifying the preferences of each
of the agents.3 Let Ur;j(ur;j(Cr;j); Aj) be the utility functions of the care recipient,
where ujr : <n+ ! < is the care recipients sub-utility function, and where < is the
set of real numbers. The argument Cr;j 2 <n+ of the utility function is a vector of n
goods consumed by the care recipient. Aj represents the ability of care recipients to
perform activities of daily living (Stabile et al., 2006), and Ur;j is twice continuously
di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strongly concave.
The care recipients ability to perform activities is dened by:
Aj = Aj(A1;j(Hj); A2;j(t1;j ; t0;j))
where H is the care recipients health status, t1;j represents the hours that the
informal caregiver spends on care activities, and t0;j indicates the hours of formal
care. We also assume that the care recipients health status is separable from the time
dedicated to care. When the care recipient is healthy, she can perform by herself the
activities of daily living, but if she is less healthy, others must perform those activities
for her.4
We suppose that both potential caregivers derive utility from the private con-
sumption, the leisure time and the ability of the care recipient to perform activities.
Therefore, Umi;j(Cmi;j ; lmi;j ; Aj); i = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2; 3 , where Cmi;j represents the
private consumption of potential caregiver mi in j decision process, and lmi;j indi-
cates the hours devoted to leisure activities of potential caregiver mi in j decision
process. We assume that Umi;j is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increas-
ing, and strongly concave. We suppose that each family members utility function
depends on the care recipients health status by way of the e¤ect of Hj on Aj , which
also a¤ects the care recipients well-being. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
only one of the two potential caregivers is nally going to devote time to informal
care activities, agent m1.
3.1 The Second Stage Game
As stated, each game is solved by backward induction. We begin by analysing the
second stage of each game as a bargaining, or as a non-bargaining solution (see Table
2). Although we cannot directly observe the reasons why, the care decision is taken by
a family decision, or by the care recipient decision, or by way of the caregiver decision.
Using this two-stage game, we are able to compare the optimum solutions of these
three care decision models, under the assumption that the informal caregiver has
accepted the care decision process. We suppose that the informal caregiver accepts
3We suppose that each agent has perfect knowledge of the preferences of the other.
4This ability to perform activities is dened here di¤erently than by Stabile et al. (2006). In our
case, we concentrate on the allocation of time, whereas they study the use of publicly and privately
nanced home care services.
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whatever caring-time is decided by the care recipient in the rst stage of the rst
model, and that the care recipient accepts whatever the informal caregiver in the
second model, or both potential caregivers in the third model, have decided in the
rst stage of the game (see Table 1).
This implies that the informal caregiver accepts the decision taken by others,
since the utility obtained for her in these situations is at least equal to the utility she
obtains when she decides on her own, Um1;2  Um1;1 and Um1;2  Um1;3:With Um1;2
being the utility obtained by the informal caregiver when she decides by herself, and
with Um1;k; k = 1; 3, being the utility obtained by the informal caregiver under the
care recipient decision, and under the family decision, respectively.
Depending on who decides at this stage, we determine the optimum level of private
consumption and leisure time for the potential caregivers, or the optimum level of
formal care in the case of the care recipient (see Table 2).
Table 2: Second Stage
Non-Bartaining Solution A Collective Approach
Constraint Decision Constraint Decision
Process 1. Care Recipient Decision t1;1,A1 Cmi;1lmi;1; hmi;1 t1;1,A1 Cmi;1lmi;1; hmi;1
Process 2. Informal Caregiver Decision t1;2 Cr;2; t0;2
Process 3. Family Decision t1;3 Cr;3; t0;3
Note: t1;j : Informal Caring Time and t0;2: Formal Caring Time.
Cmi;j : Consumption;lmi;j : Leisure Time and hmi;j : Time spent in labour market
Care Recipient Decision Pezzin and Schone (1999, 2002) explain that when po-
tential caregivers co-reside, their interactions are cooperative, but when they live
independently there is no bargaining solution for the game. We here use those two
approaches, a Non-Bargaining approach and a Collective Approach. In the rst, deci-
sions are taken independently and, in the second, decisions are taken in a bargaining
framework. It is assumed that the informal caregiver accepts the decision taken by
the care recipient in the rst stage of the game. In this case, t1;1 is xed, since it is
determined in the rst stage of the game, thus A1 is also xed.
In both cases, we assume that only one of the two potential caregivers is going
to devote time to informal care activities, agent m1. What we are interested in is
studying the e¤ects that an increase in t1;1 has on both the hours spent in market
work and leisure time, to see if the impact of the caring-time dictated by the care
recipient is equal, in both a non-bargaining approach and a collective approach.
In the rst approach, we suppose that the potential caregivers decide separately
the private consumption, the labour supply and the leisure time. For example,
the case of two potential caregivers, a mother and her daughter who live inde-
pendently. At the equilibrium point, the individuals marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between individual is leisure and private consumption is equal to the wage
rate. From that, we obtain the optimum levels of leisure time, private consump-
tion and labour supply, l^mi;1 (wmi; Ymi; A1; Tmi;1) ; C^mi;1 (wmi; Ymi; A1; Tmi;1) and
h^mi;1 (wmi; Ymi; A1; Tmi;1) i = 1; 2; respectively, for each potential caregiver, which
depends on the wage rate, wmi, on the non-labour income, Ymi, on the ability to
perform activities of daily living of the care recipient, A1; and on the the total time
the agent mi can devote to care and non-care activities, Tmi;1 (see Appendix A).
In the second approach, we consider the usual strategy of collective models (Chi-
appori 1988, 1992), where the decisions made by the potential caregivers are Pareto-
e¢ cient, and in which both potential caregivers share what is left after private con-
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sumption. In this case, the caregiver can be the daughter of the disabled person, and
the other potential caregiver can be her husband (see Appendix A).
The rst-order conditions imply that the individuals marginal rate of substitution
between individual is leisure and private consumption is equal to the wage rate in
equilibrium, in line with the non-bargaining solution. Although, in the collective
approach, the optimum levels of leisure time, labour supply and private consumption,
for each agent, mi; i = 1; 2, are also functions of the wage rate, the non-labour income
and the total time available of the other agent, mk; k 6= i; k = 1; 2:
In both cases, the non-bargaining solution and the collective approach, we obtain
similar results for both the hours devoted to labour and to leisure activities (see
Appendix A). Nevertheless, we also see that the impact of t1;1 on h^mi;1 is more likely
to be greater, since the fraction of residual non-labour income allocated to the spouse
m1; m1; considerably increases when the time devoted to caring increases, that is,
agent m2 compensates m1 for devoting time to care activities, and thus the hours
devoted to the labour market decrease more than in the non-bargaining approach.
With respect to the level of utility that the informal caregiver, m1; obtains from
devoting time to informal care, UCm1;1; the utility derived from the argument A1;
the care recipients ability to perform daily activities, will not di¤er between the
non-bargaining approach and the collective approach, since A1 is xed in both cases.
However, informal caregivers are time constrained, which supposes that an increase
in the time devoted to care activities could produce labour and leisure costs, which
diminish the utility obtained from the arguments Cm1;1 and lm1;1, and so decreases
the utility derived from the care activities.
Nevertheless, the informal caregiver has to accept the care decision process, im-
plying that the overall utility achieved by the informal caregiver has to be at least
equal to the utility that she obtains when she decides the caring-time on her own,
Um1;1  Um1;2; which depends on the level of caring-time determined by the care
recipient in the rst stage, but also, as we have seen, in the compensation that the
informal caregiver can receive in the collective approach. Thus, the losses of util-
ity derived from the imposed caring-time can be compensated for in the collective
approach, but not in the non-bargaining approach, which can result in the informal
caregiver rejecting the caring-time imposed by the care recipient (see First Stage
Game).
Informal caregiver Decision and Family Decision We now consider that the
care recipient accepts the decision taken by the informal caregiver, or the family
decision, in the rst stage of the game (see Table 1). In this case, t1;2 is xed, which
is determined in the rst stage of the game, although A2 is not xed (see Table 2).
Therefore, the care recipient decides the optimum number of hours of formal care,
and the level of her own private consumption. Given that t1;2 is xed, and that Tr;2
is also xed, with Tr;2 being the total time needed to perform daily living activities,
from t1;2 + t0;2 = Tr;2; we can easily obtain t0;2; that is, the formal caring-time
in equilibrium. It is straightforward to obtain the level of private consumption in
equilibrium, from the budget constraint, Cr;2 (see Appendix A), in such a way that,
the lower the informal caring-time, the higher the formal caring-time needed by the
care recipient and the lower the level of private consumption of the care recipient.
Nevertheless, the care recipient must accept whatever decision is taken by the
caregiver or the family decision, even when the level of utility of this individual is
considerably lower than that obtained when the decision was his own, thus Ur;2  Ur;1
and Ur;3  Ur;1: The care recipient could be worse o¤ if he does not accept the
informal caring-time decided in the rst stage, since if he does not accept it, the total
7
time needed to perform daily living activities would have to be covered by formal
help, Tr;2 = t0;2; which decreases the private consumption of the care recipient.
The potential caregivers would tend to determine lower levels of caring-time, since
they do not derive utility from that obtained by the care recipient, they only derive
utility from his ability to perform activities of daily living, Aj ; and do not take into
account the losses of well-being that the care recipient incurs from the increase in
formal caring-time. We expect that the care recipient will be worse o¤ when the
informal caregiver decides on her own, since she will spend fewer hours of caring-
time, not being compensated by the other potential caregivers, as we observe in the
rst stage of the game.
3.2 The First Stage Game
We analyze here the rst stage of each game for each of the three models (see Table
1). In the rst model, the care recipient decides the hours of informal care; in the
second, the caregiver decides by herself; and in the third the hours spent on care are
the result of a family decision (see Table 3).
Table 3: First Stage
Non-Bartaining Solution A Collective Approach
Process 1. Care Recipient Decision t1;1,t0;1,Cr;1
Process 2. Informal Caregiver Decision Cmi;2lmi;2; hmi;2; t1;2
Process 3. Family Decision Cmi;3lmi;3; hmi;3; t1;3
Note: t1;j : Informal Caring Time and t0;1: Formal Caring Time.
Cmi;j : Consumption; lmi;j : Leisure Time and hmi;j : Time spent in labour market
Care Recipient Decision In this game, it is the care recipient who decides the
hours of informal care, t1;1. In this stage, we also determine the optimum value of
private consumption of the care recipient, Cr;1; and the formal caring-time, t0;1. From
the rst order condition, and taking into account the budget and time constraint, we
obtain the optimum level of the private consumption, the formal and informal caring
time as functions of the total time needed to perform daily living activities, Tr;1; the
non-labour income of the care recipient, Yr;1; and his health status, H1(see Appendix
B).
We examine the optimum informal caring time xed by the care recipient to be
able to compare this caring-time with the caring time determined in the rest of the
care decision processes. The informal caring-time is determined to be about the
total time needed to perform daily living activities, t1;1  Tr;1 , when we assume
that the informal caring-time is considered to be unpaid by the care recipient. Thus,
the optimum level of formal care determined in this stage may be close to zero (see
Figure 1), and the time xed by the care recipient may be considerably greater than
the time that the informal caregiver would prefer: In Figure 1, the time xed by the
care recipient is tNA1;1 : In this case, the utility level of the informal caregiver would be
considerably lower than that obtained when she decides by herself, Um1;1 << Um1;2,
so this is not a Pareto superior solution. The level of utility achieved by the informal
caregiver in this game, if she accepts tNA1;1 , is represented by U
NA
m1;1in Figure 2. We
have assumed that the informal caregiver accepts the decision taken by others when
the utility obtained for her is at least equal to the utility that she obtains when she
decides on her own, Um1;2  Um1;1, but in this case Um1;1 << Um1;2, that is, the
utility that she achieves, if she accepts, is considerably lower. Therefore, the informal
caregiver would reject the care recipients request, that is, she would not spend time
in informal care, tNA1;1 in Figure 1.
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The informal caregiver would only accept the care recipients request if t1;1  t1;2
when the potential caregivers decide separately in the second stage of the game, or
t1;1 > t1;2 when the interactions between the potential caregivers in the second stage
are cooperative, since the potential nal caregiver may be compensated in such a way
that the level of informal caring time accepted will be t1;1 in this state (see Figure
1), which corresponds to a level of utility of the informal caregiver derived from
the caring activity UCm1;1 (see Figure 2). Therefore, we would not expect signicant
di¤erences between the informal caring-time decided by the informal caregiver, and
the informal caring-time decided by the care recipient, and we would not expect
signicant di¤erences between the level of utility derived from the informal caring-
time in both situations.
(Figure 1 goes here)
Informal caregiver Decision - A Non-Bargaining Solution In the second
process, Informal caregiver Decision, the caregiver decides by herself the hours to
devote to care activities. We maintain the assumption that, even though both agents
are potential caregivers, only one is going to be caregiver, in our case agent m1,
in such a way that the informal caregiver decides individually her optimum level
of private consumption, labour supply, leisure time and informal caring-time (see
Appendix B).
As in the second stage, the levels of these variables individually decided by the
informal caregiver are functions of the wage rate, wmi, the non-labour income, Ymi,
the formal caring-time needed by the care recipient, t0;2; the health status of the
care recipient, H2 and the total time the agent mi can devote to care and non-care
activities, Tmi;2:
Focusing on the amount of informal caring time, we can compare the time given
to informal care activities in both situations, when the care recipient decides rst,
process 1, and when the informal caring-time is determined by the informal caregiver
in process 2; that is to say, the informal caring-time that the informal caregiver would
prefer to spend, t1;2 in Figure 1: From the rst order conditions of both maximization
problems, we obtain a necessary condition to observe a similar informal caring-time
in both situations:
@Ur;j=@Cr;j
@Ur;j=@Aj
=
@Um1;j=@lm1;j
@Um1;j=@Aj
 (1)
where  =
@A2;j
@t1;j
  @A2;j@t0;j
@A2;j
@t1;j
and j = 1; 2; with  > 0 to satisfy the rst order conditions
of the care recipient maximization problem, and with @A1@A2;1 =
@A2
@A2;2
and @A2;1@t1;1 =
@A2;2
@t1;2
in the non-bargaining solution, that is, the same ability requirements in both
situations, and with the same e¤ect of the informal caring-time on the ability to
perform activities of daily living, in both situations.
When the care recipients marginal rate of substitution between consumption,
and the ability to perform activities of daily living, is equal to the marginal rate
of substitution between leisure and the ability to perform activities of daily living,
weighted by , t1;2 is equal to t^1;1: Thus, there is no di¤erence between the decision
taken by the care recipient and that taken by the informal caregiver. However, in
the case that the care recipients ability to perform activities of daily living increases
much more when the care recipient receives informal caring-time, than when he/she
receives formal caring-time, this equality is less sustainable, since the demand for
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informal caring-time by the care recipient would considerably increase, creating an
unacceptable situation for the informal caregiver, given the resulting losses of utility.
The utility that the informal caregiver derives from the informal caring activity
is represented by UCm1;2, with Um1;j being the overall level of utility reached by the
informal caregiver in Figure 2.
(Figure 2 goes here)
Family Decision - Collective Approach In the third game, we model the fam-
ily decision as an intra-family bargaining model, following the collective approach
(Chiappori, 1988, 1992), since this takes into account the intra-family allocation of
resources, in our particular case, the allocation of resources between both potential
caregivers (see Appendix B).
Using this collective approach, we may determine the optimum level of informal
caring-time in a bargaining approach, t1;3: We nd that t1;3; that is to say, the
optimum hours devoted to care activities in the family decision, is likely to be greater
than t1;2, the optimum hours devoted to care activities in the informal caregiver
decision, when agent m2 considerably compensates m1 by way of increasing m1; the
fraction of residual non-labour income allocated to the spouse m1 for spending more
time on care.
Thus, we nd cases of over-provision of informal care in the family decision model,
since the informal caregiver can receive compensation by way of an increase in m1,
which produces an increase in the time spent on care, which can be even greater than
the informal caring-time demanded by the care recipient, t1;1:
This a¤ects the level of utility that the informal caregiver derives from the time
that she devotes to care, UCm1;3, since it is considerably lower than that obtained
when she decides on her own the level of informal caring-time, UCm1;2, holding all
other variables constant, and even lower when the care recipient decides his informal
caring-time requirements, UCm1;1 under the assumption that in the three cases the level
of utility achieved by the informal caregiver is the same, Um1;1 = Um1;2 = Um1;3;
corresponding to Um1;j in Figure 2.
The remainder of the paper empirically studies the e¤ects that these care decision
processes have on the time spent on care activities, and on the level of satisfaction
of the informal caregiver. As explained, we determine whether, depending on the
care decision process, informal caregivers must devote more time to care activities
than they would prefer. With the family decision, we are more likely to observe
that the informal caregiver tends to devote more time to informal care activities,
which also produces a considerable decrease in the level of utility reached by the
informal caregiver. With the care recipient decision, since the care recipient considers
informal caring-time to be unpaid, time spent on care is considerably increased, which
can result in the informal caregiver devoting more time to informal care activities
than he/she would prefer. However, when the informal caregiver does not receive
compensation, and given that she must accept the informal caring-time demanded
by the care recipient, we would expect that those Pareto inferior solutions, that is,
those situations in which the overall utility reached by the informal caregiver is lower
than that obtained when she takes the decisions, will be rejected by the informal
caregiver. Thus, we would expect no di¤erences between the informal caring-time
decided by the informal caregiver, and that determined by the care recipient, and thus
we would not expect signicant di¤erences in the utility derived from the informal
caring-time in either situation.
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4 Data
We use data from the Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly (Encuesta
de Apoyo Informal a los Mayores) conducted in 2004. This survey was developed
by the Institute for the Elderly and Social Services (Instituto de Mayores y Servicios
Sociales) of the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Services. It contains
information on individuals 18 years and older, residing in Spain, and devoting time
to informal care activities. This survey excludes formal caregivers who receive the
equivalent of a salary, but leaves open the possibility of informal caregivers receiving
monetary compensation. It includes any kind of assistance with activities that the
care recipient can no longer do alone, excluding those tasks that were done by others,
prior to the current need for care.5 In consequence, we have a sample of 1,219 informal
caregivers.
Mean and standard deviations for the main variables used are presented in Table
1: Column (1) reports values for the whole sample, and columns (3), (5), and (7)
include values for the samples of informal caregivers who report devoting time to
informal care activities for less than two hours, from three to ve hours, and more
than ve hours, per day, respectively. We observe that the mean of the informal
caregivers is 52.6 years of age. Those who report spending time on care for less than
two hours are the youngest, 47, and the oldest are those who report time spent on
care for more than ve hours, about 55. The number of women engaged in caring
activities is high, about 85.2% in 2004, even as women have become more involved
in the labour market. The greatest number of informal caregivers, 40.3%, have a
low level of education, but those who report spending time in informal care for less
than two hours per day, 48.9%, have a medium level of education. About 74% of
caregivers in 2004 are the spouse or the son/daughter of the care recipient. Hence,
care for disabled people continues largely to be provided by family members, with
the son/daughter of the care recipient primarily providing this caring-time, about
59.4%. About 77% of these care providers are married/cohabiting. The number of
children of the care provider is signicantly low, 0.98.
With regard to the population of the city of residence among informal caregivers,
the percentage of care providers is greater, 47.9%, in cities with more than 100 000
inhabitants in the whole sample, and in all three caring-time intervals, reaching 57.4%
among those who report devoting time for less than two hours per day. In the case of
cities with less than 10 000 inhabitants, the percentage of caregivers is greater when
they report devoting more than ve hours per day to informal care.
About 28 % of informal caregivers spend time in work activities. 45.3% devote
less than two hours per day to informal care, whereas 36.3% devote from 3 to 5
hours per day. The percentage of homemakers devoting time to care activities is
considerably higher, 45.7%, with 50% devoting more than ve hours per day.
Analyzing the di¤erent kinds of care, and the decision process variables, we nd
that the number of those who report spending time on care of less than two hours
per day is 15.6%. The number of informal caregivers who report spending time
more intensively, more than ve hours, is dramatically greater, 60.5%. Such care is
usually classied into two groups, depending on the needs of the care recipient. The
informal caregiver can be engaged in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL),
such as cleaning, ironing, making lunch, and administrative tasks such as shopping,
visits to the doctor, to the bank; or in Personal Activities of Daily Living (ADL),
such as bathing or showering, grooming, dressing, eating, etc, which are more time-
5For instance, in the case of housework, only the additional part of housework due to the illness
or disability of the care receipient should be seen as informal care.
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consuming. As we can observe in Table 1, informal caregivers are intensive caregivers,
since the number of those who report time spent in ADL is 74.2%, and those who
spend more than 5 hours per day on care are engaged in more ADL, 82.5% in 2004.
The number of primary caregivers is high in the whole sample, 82.5%, due to
the high number of those who spend more hours in care activities and are primary
caregivers, 90.6%. The number of primary caregivers who spend fewer hours is con-
siderably lower, 62.1%. 75.2% of caregivers are engaged in permanent care for the
disabled person, with this being greater for those who report devoting more than ve
hours per day to informal care, 79.9%.
Given that di¤erent living arrangements are likely to a¤ect the amount of care,
we include in this analysis the travel time between the informal caregiver and the
care recipient, the mean being 9.4 minutes, with this time being less, 6.97 minutes,
for those who report spending more than ve hours of caring time. In the same
way, the existence of care recipients who cohabit with a relative may a¤ect the hours
devoted to care. About 56.3% of care recipients cohabit with a relative, with extra-
residential care being greater for those less intensive caregivers. 32.2% of caregivers
in 2004, received monetary compensation from the care recipient.6 We also include
other variables to control for whether other people are looking after a particular care
recipient, that is, whether informal and/or formal care is supplied by people other
than the respondent. Overall, 16.3% of informal caregivers report that the care
recipients receive formal help. Those who spend less than 2 hours per day, 23.7%, on
care report receiving greater formal help. However, care supplied by family members
is lower for those who report spending less than 2 hours per day.
With respect to the care decision processes, we observe that the decision to engage
in care is taken by the caregivers in 61.9% of the sample in 2004, by the family in
32.5%, and by the care recipient in 5.6%. Caregivers decide for themselves in a
greater percentage in all the intervals, but the informal caregiver decisions decrease
with the intensity of the caring-time. However, the family decision increases with
the intensity of the caring-time. The percentage of care recipients who decide for
themselves is considerably lower in all the intervals, but the relationship between
intensive caring-time and the care recipient decision is negative.
Finally, a typical care recipient is an 80 year old woman with health problems,
with a low level of education, receiving a pension and with no spouse
In sum, we observe that a typical caregiver is a middle-aged woman, married,
with a lower educational level. She lives in a city of more than 100 000 inhabitants,
is probably a homemaker and has a small number of children. She is the primary
caregiver, does these tasks every day and decides on her own whether to engage in
care. However, di¤erences exist among those who devote di¤erent daily amounts of
caring-time.
5 Informal Caring-Time: Empirical Model And Results
5.1 Empirical Model
We are here interested in empirically analysing whether, depending on the care deci-
sion process, informal caregivers devote di¤erent amounts of time to care activities.
We expect that, under the family decision situation, the informal caregiver tends to
be a more intensive caregiver, and that the informal caring-time decided by the care
recipient would be no di¤erent from that decided by the informal caregiver (see Fig-
ure 1). We use data from the Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly
6There is no available information about the compensation that informal caregivers might receive
from other potential caregivers.
12
in which respondents are asked about the reasons, if any, why informal caregivers
engage in informal care, di¤erentiating between the caregivers own decision, a family
decision, and a recipient decision. In previous research, the data used do not account
for the decision processes, which can have an e¤ect on the caring-time, since those
caregivers who do not decide for themselves the hours devoted to care activities can
be required to spend more hours than those who do decide for themselves, as we have
seen in the theoretical approach.7
With respect to the informal caring-time, informal caregivers are asked how many
hours they devote, on an average day, to informal care activities, classifying them
as: less than two hours, from three to ve hours, or more than ve hours.8 To
analyse how informal caring time varies from one category to another, depending on
the informal care decision process, we use a multinomial logit model (MNLM), and
we control by the demographic characteristics of both the informal caregiver and the
recipient.
Even though our outcome, informal caring-time, can be considered as partially
ordered, in which case, we should have used an Ordinal Model, we have tested the
parallel regression assumption, implicit in the Ordinal Model, by comparing the
estimate from the J   1 binary regressions,
Pr(y  m jx ) = 

m   x0

for m = 1; 2; :::; J   1
where the s are allowed to di¤er across the equations. This parallel regres-
sion assumption implies that 1 = 2 = ::: = J 1: We compute the approxi-
mate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories (chi-
squared(35)=80.47(0.000) including all controls), and we conclude that we have evi-
dence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated at the 1% level of sig-
nicance. We have also compared the predictions from ordered logit and multinomial
logit, obtaining that probabilities predicted for one of the categories ended abruptly
in the case of ordered logit predictions. This abrupt truncation of the distribution
for the ordered logit model is substantively unrealistic (see Long and Freese, 2006).
Therefore, when the proper ordering is ambiguous, the models for nominal outcomes
can be considered and, in these circumstances, we use the Multinomial Logit Model
(MNLM).
In the MNLM, we estimate a separate binary logit for each pair of outcome
categories. Formally, the MNLM can be written as:
lnmjb = ln
Pr(y=mjx )
Pr(y=bjx ) = x
0mjb for m = 1 to J
where b is the base category, J = 3 and x is a vector of the demographic char-
7We cannot observe the reasons why the decision of care is taken by way of a family decision,
by way of the care recipient decision or by way of the caregiver decision, and so we cannot test
why informal caregivers accept a family decision or a recipient decision, since we have no available
information, for instance, about the potential caregivers. Therefore, we cannot estimate a structural
model of caregiver behaviour, see Hiedemann and Stern (1999) for an example.
8Specically, the Spanish Survey of Infomal Assistance asked informal caregivers the hours they
spent caring for the dependent person, in four categories: less than 1 hour, from 1 to 2 hours,
from 3 to 5 hours and more than 5 hours. In our work, we combine categories "less than 1 hour"
and "from 1 to 2 hours" in a new category "less than two hours" since we have observed that those
categories are indistinguishable. We have computed a test for combining alternatives to test whether
the categories are indistinguishable, with respect to the variables in the model, that is to say, if
none of the independent variables signicantly a¤ect the odds of alternative m versus alternative n
(Anderson, 1984). Alternatives m versus n being indistinguishable corresponds to the hypothesis
that
H0 : 1;mjn = ::: = i;mjn = ::: = I;mjn = 0
with i being the coe¢ cient associated with the explanatory variable xi. We have tested this
using both Wald tests and LR tests, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that categories "less than
1 hour" and "less than 2 hours" are indistinguishable.
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acteristics of the informal caregiver, and of the recipient, and of the decision process
variables.9
The variables capturing the demographic characteristics of the informal caregiver
include her age, her gender, her educational level, her marital status, her number
of children, her work status, the population of her city of residence, and whether
she receives monetary compensation for care activities.10 With respect to the care
recipientscharacteristics, we observe her age, her gender, her educational level, and
her health status. In the help variables, we control for the kind of task developed,
that is IADL and ADL activities, and the travel time between the caregiver and the
recipient. Moreover, sharing the same household may lead to a greater obligation of
family members to engage in care, and so we include a variable to control whether
the care recipient lives with a relative. We also include variables to control for the
frequency and permanency of the care, and if the care recipient receives formal help
or help from another family member. We control for the care decision processes by
using the caregiver decision as the variable of reference.
We have computed marginal changes and discrete changes for each explanatory
variable. The J discrete-change coe¢ cients for a variable, one for each outcome
category, can be summarized by computing the average of the absolute values of the
changes across all outcome categories,
 = 1J
JP
j=1
Pr(y=jjx )xi  where the absolute value is taken because the sum of the
changes, without taking the absolute value, is necessarily zero. However, discrete
change does little to illuminate the dynamics among the outcomes. To account for
that, we also study how the variables a¤ect the odds of a person devoting one amount
of caring-time over another. Holding other variables constant, the changed factor in
the odds of outcome m versus outcome n, as xi increase by ; equals:
mjn (x;xi + )
mjn (x;xi)
= ei;mjn 
5.2 Results
To analyse the e¤ect of each variable on the change in the probability of devoting
caring-time, we present Table 5, which shows the average absolute change of this
probability by informal caregivers, controlling by the caregiver Demographic Char-
acteristics, the Recipient Demographic Characteristics and the Help and Decision
Variables. In this way, we analyse the impact of these variables on changing the
decision of devoting time to informal care activities.11
9The MNLM makes the assumption known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
In this model:
Pr(y=mjx )
Pr(y=njx ) = e
x0(mjb njb )
where the odds do not depend on other available alternatives. Thus, adding or deleting alter-
natives does not a¤ect the odds among the remaining alternatives. The independence assumption
follows from the initial assumption that the disturbances are independent and homoscedastic. We
consider two of the most common tests developed for testing the validity of the assumption, the
Hausmans specication test (Hausman and McFadden, 1998), and Small-Hsiao test ( Small and
Hsiao, 1985). We cannot reject the null hypothesis, that is to say, odds are independent of other
alternatives. We nd similar results even with a di¤erent base category.
10We do not include the income of the caregiver, since respondents are not asked in the survey.
11Results are presented for the joint sample of men and women. Tests reject separate specications
by gender. For consistency, we have also estimated with di¤erent sub-samples to correct for other
selection biases. We consider that the selection bias may be generated by either age or frequency
of the help. To that end, we change the age range and we estimate only using those caregivers
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The variables of interest are the family decision and the recipient decision. In
Column (1), we capture the relationship between the care decision processes and
the change in the probability of devoting di¤erent amounts of caring-time, without
controlling for care recipient characteristics. This approach yields an upward bias
in the estimation of the e¤ect of the care decision processes, as shown in Column
(2). As we have specied in our theoretical analysis, the utility function of the care-
giver depends on the ability of the recipient to perform activities of daily living, with
this being controlled by the recipients characteristics in our empirical analysis. The
variations in the average change in the probability of devoting di¤erent amounts of
caring-time decreases from 8.21 to 7.6 percentage points, when the Care Recipient
Characteristics are included, which suggests that omitting care recipient characteris-
tics results in an overestimation of the e¤ect of the family decision on the probability
of devoting di¤erent amounts of caring-time, even though the poor health status of
the care recipient is the only signicant characteristic.12 In the case of the recipient
decision, this variable is not signicant in any estimation.
(Table 5 about here)
The specication in Column (3) controls for care decision processes when the
informal caregiver reports being employed in the labour market. We observe that
the average change in the probability of devoting di¤erent amounts of caring-time
is greater for those who engage in care as a result of a family decision, and are not
employed. It is more likely that these individuals will spend more hours on care.
The recipient decision variable a¤ects the probability of devoting di¤erent amounts
of caring-time in a di¤erent way, since the average change in the probability is greater
for those who report being employed, and since they engage in care as a result of a
care recipient decision, but this variable continues to be not signicant.
Column (4) in Table 5 includes recipient age dummies to account for the di¤er-
ences in care recipient needs at di¤erent periods of their lives, showing that the e¤ect
of the age variable is greater for those who are more than 80 years old, but are not
signicant for the three intervals considered (under 65 years, between 65 and 80, and
over 80 years). The average changes of the probability of devoting di¤erent amounts
of caring-time produced by the care decision process, have not appreciably varied
with respect to the estimation in Column (2).
To study the dynamics among the informal caring-time intervals, the MNLM
includes a number of coe¢ cients, which present di¢ culties of interpretation of the
e¤ects on all pairs of outcome categories. We have developed odds-ratio plots, Figure
3 (Long and Freese, 2006), from a model that includes the Recipient Demographic
Characteristics, the caregiver Demographic Characteristics and the Help and Decision
Variables, using the same model as in Column (2) of Table (5), corresponding with the
better-tting model. In the odds-ratio plot, the independent variables are represented
in a separate row. The horizontal axis indicates the relative magnitude of the 
coe¢ cients associated with each outcome. The numbers correspond to the outcome
who devote time to care activites every day. Results are consistent with those previously obtained
and are available upon request. We have also analysed changes in the informal caring time, using
the Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly 1994 (Encuesta de Apoyo Informal a
los Mayores), obtaining similar results to those obtained using the Spanish Survey of Informal
Assistance for the Elderly for the year 2004.
12We have also computed some measures of t, the Pseudo-R2, with this being greater in the
estimation including the care recipient demographic characteristics, thus showing evidence in favor
of the model in Column (2). However this measures of t always increases as new variables are
added, so an adjusted version is also computed, McFaddens Adj R2. As in the previous case, this
value is greater for the estimation in Column (2):We have also computed an information measure
to compare the estimated models, the Bayesian information criterion, with the more negative value,
the better-tting model. In our case, this corresponds with the Column (2) estimated model.
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categories, that is to say, "1" denotes less than two hours of caring-time, which
corresponds to the base category, "2" indicates from three to ve hours of caring-
time, and "3" corresponds to more than ve hours of caring time. The additive scale
on the bottom axis measures the value of i;mjn. The multiplicative scale on the top
axis measures exp(i;mjn) , which are the odds of a person to devote one amount
of caring-time over another with  = 1. The distance between a pair of outcomes
indicates the magnitude of the e¤ect, and the statistical signicance is added by
drawing a line between categories for which there is no signicant coe¢ cient.
As expected, under both the family decision and the care recipient decision vari-
ables, it is more likely that the informal caregiver will tend to devote more time to
informal care activities, but the care recipient decision is not signicant. There are
no di¤erences between the informal caring-time decided by the informal caregiver
and that determined by the care recipient, as we have hypothesized in our theoreti-
cal framework. In Figure 3:3, Help and Decision variables, we observe that the odds
of choosing more than ve hours, versus less than two, and versus from three to
ve hours, are 53.5% and 74.9% greater, respectively. In the case of the care recipi-
ent decision, we observe that the odds of choosing more than ve hours, versus less
than two hours, and versus from three to ve hours, are greater, with this being not
signicant.
(Figure 3 about here)
As we have outlined in the descriptive analysis, informal assistance to the care
recipient, is considerably focused on people of poorer health status. That variable is
the only signicant recipient demographic characteristic (see Table 5). The average
absolute change in the probability of choosing di¤erent amounts of caring-time for
a recipient with poorer health status is 0.07. With respect to the other recipient
demographic characteristics, we observe in Figure 3:1 that only the age, the level of
education and receiving a pension, have a signicant impact on the dynamics among
the informal caring-time, a¤ecting only the odds of devoting more than ve hours
versus from three to ve hours, and increasing the odds of devoting more hours to
informal care activities (see Figure 3:1). An increase of one year in the age of the
recipient only signicantly decreases by 0.75 times the odds of choosing more than
ve hours of caring-time, versus from three to ve hours. However, this e¤ect is not
permanent, since the coe¢ cients of age squared are opposite to the coe¢ cients of
age. The odds of choosing from three to ve hours, versus more than ve hours of
caring-time are 0.52 times smaller for illiterate care recipients. For those who receive
a pension, we observe the odds of choosing more than ve hours, versus from three
to ve hours, are greater and signicant.
As expected, when we consider the informal caregivers demographic characteris-
tics, being female and a homemaker has larger e¤ects on choosing di¤erent amounts of
caring-time, making it more likely that the informal caregiver will spend more hours
in caring-time (see Figure 3:2). When the caregiver has a degree and is employed,
it is more likely that he/she will spend fewer hours on care, with this also occur-
ring when we consider the number of children of the caregiver. The other caregiver
demographic characteristics have no impact on the dynamics of informal caring-time.
The gender of the caregiver is only signicant in the odds of choosing from three
to ve hours, versus choosing less than two hours, or versus more than ve hours.
For caregivers who report having a degree or a medium level of education, the odds
of choosing to devote from three to ve hours to caring time, versus less than two,
are 0.61 and 0.45 times smaller, respectively. When we analyse the work status of the
caregivers, we observe that the odds of choosing the two more intensive categories,
from three to ve hours versus more than ve hours, are signicant and greater for
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those who report spending time in the labour market. The number of children of
the caregiver a¤ects the odds of choosing more than ve hours, versus less than two
hours, with this being 0.84 times smaller and signicant.
Finally, for the help and decision variables, as expected, cohabitation with a
relative produces the largest e¤ect, cohabitation increases the likelihood that the
caregiver will spend more time on caring. This result is maintained if the caregiver
is the primary caregiver, making it more likely that the informal caregiver will spend
more time on caring. The same occurs if the caregiver is engaged in ADL, that is,
more time-consuming activities. Considering the relative of the care recipient, we
have found that it is more likely that the spouse of the care recipient will spend more
than ve hours, versus from three to ve hours. The same occurs in the case of the
son/daughter, increasing the probability of devoting more than ve hours to care.
We have also found that other family membersassistance, and informal care, may
be complementary, since this assistance is more likely when the informal caregiver
spends more than ve hours on care. Receiving a monetary compensation is not
signicant in our estimations.13
We have considered necessary to control for the cohabitation status, to avoid
overestimating the e¤ect of the care decision process, since those who cohabit tend
to spend more time in caring than those who do not cohabit. However, it should be
noted that this variable could a¤ect the care decision process. For instance, it could
be that the family decision follows from the fact that the recipient is a cohabitant, and
thus the family decision follows from the fact that it is more convenient to arrange
the care in this way. We are not able to control for that since we have no information
about the living arrangements of the potential caregiver, and of the care recipient,
when the care decision process took place. The same occurs when we consider other
variables, such as the work status of the potential caregivers.
In addition, we have some endogeneity concerns about certain variables included
in the analysis such as the decision to cohabit or the work status of the caregiver.
Both the decision to cohabit and the work status of the caregiver might be endogenous
since the care recipient could cohabit with a relative or the informal caregiver could
be employed, depending on the amount of informal caring time required by the care
recipient. That could a¤ect our estimates
To tackle these problems, we have considered several sub-samples. First, we have
analysed separately those who cohabit with a relative and those who do not. Second,
we have studied the informal caregiver subsample of those who devote time to work
activities, and the subsample of those who are not employed independently. These
do not change our results. Third, we have carried out our estimates without those
variables that can generate endogeneity problems, and our results are maintained.
However, as stated above, if we exclude those variables that can produce endogeneity
problems, we overestimate the e¤ects of the care decision processes.14
As we have explained above, depending on the care decision process, informal
caregivers devote more time to care activities when they do not decide for themselves.
As expected, under both the family decision and the care recipient decision variables,
it is more likely that the informal caregiver will tend to devote more time to informal
care activities, but the care recipient decision is not signicant. The family decision
variable has the largest e¤ect on the choice of di¤erent amounts of caring-time,
increasing the odds of devoting more hours to informal care activities, which can
13This variable does not include the fraction of residual non-labour income allocated among
potential caregivers in a cooperative situation, since the caregiver reports that this is a monetary
compensation received from the care recipient.
14All these results are available upon request.
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a¤ect the level of satisfaction derived from the caregiver activity, as we show in the
next section.
6 Informal caregivers Satisfaction: Empirical Model and Re-
sults
6.1 Empirical Model
The care satisfaction information may help to explain informal caregiversbehaviour,
in the same way that job satisfaction information is used to measure the workers
well-being, that is to say, this may help policy makers to design strategies to increase
the satisfaction of informal caregivers.
In the Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly 2004, respondents are
asked whether engaging in care provides them with great satisfaction. The question
provides the response categories of strongly disagree (SD), disagree (D), neither dis-
agree nor agree (ND), agree (A),and strongly agree (SA). We consider this variable to
be representative of the level of satisfaction that the informal caregiver derives from
devoting time to care activities, in such a way that we are able to study whether the
level of utility that the informal caregiver derives from the time that she devotes to
care, UCm1;k; (k = 1; 3); is considerably lower than that obtained when she decides on
her own the level of informal caring-time, UCm1;2; (see Figure 2).
In order to analyze such responses, ordinal regression models have become com-
mon. We compute an ordered logit model (OLM) to analyse the e¤ects that care
decision processes have on the level of satisfaction of the informal caregiver, control-
ling for informal caregiver characteristics, informal caring-time, labour, leisure and
health costs.15 The models for ordinal outcomes account for the di¤erent distance
between two responses. For example, the distance between strongly agreeing and
agreeing might not be the same as the distance between agree and disagree. In this
case, although the outcome is discrete, the multinomial logit model would fail to
account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. The responses are coded
1,2,...,5.16
The model is built around a latent regression:
ui = x
0
i + "i
with u being the latent variable, " is an unobserved disturbance term which is
assumed to be logistically distributed, and x is a vector which includes variables to
control for the caring-time, the care decision process, the labour, leisure and health
costs. We also include as control the demographic characteristics of both the caregiver
and the care recipient.
As usual, u is unobserved. The relation between the unobserved ui and the
observed outcome for i, ui = 1; 2; :::; 5 can be summarized as follows:
ui = 1 if ui  1;
= 2 if 1 < ui  2;
:::
= 5 if 4  ui
Thus, when the latent u crosses a cutpoint , the observed category changes.
The s are unknown parameters to be estimated with . We dene the ordered logit
15We do not include these variables in the previous analysis, since they are not exogenous factors
in the estimation of the time devoted to care activities. Respondents are asked whether they have
incurred labour, leisure and health costs through their participation in informal care activities.
16We compute the approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response
categories, concluding that this test provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption cannot
be rejected at the 5% level.
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model as:
lnmj>m(x) = ln
Pr(umjx)
Pr(u>mjx) for m = 1; :::; J   1
For a unit increase in xi, the odds of an outcome being less than or equal to m is
changed by the factor e i , holding all other variables constant, are computed as:
mj>m(x;xi + 1)
mj>m(x;xi)
= e i
The value of the odds ratio does not depend on the value of m, which is why the
parallel regression assumption is also known as the proportional odds assumption.
Therefore, we could interpret the odds ratios as follows, for a unit increase in xi, the
odds of a lower outcome compared with a higher outcome are changed by the factor
e i , holding all other variables constant.
6.2 Results
Since the objective of this analysis is to study the e¤ects of care decision processes
on the caregivers satisfaction derived from caregiver activities, Column (1) only
includes the caring-time variables, by using the caring-time for less than two hours
as the variable of reference. We introduce a dummy variable which takes the value one
if the informal caregiver reports devoting time from three to ve hours, and another
dummy variable which takes the value one if the informal caregiver devote more
than ve hours. Neither of these variables are signicant, even when we introduce as
controls the caregiver and the recipient demographic characteristics, Column (4).17
In Column (2), we not only control for the caring-time, but also introduce the
care decision processes, family decision and recipient decision, with the caregiver
decision being the variable of reference, to study whether the level of utility that
the informal caregiver derives from the time that she devotes to care is considerably
lower than that obtained when she decides on her own the level of informal caring-
time. We observe that the family decision a¤ects the odds of having more care
satisfaction, with this, compared to lower satisfaction, being 0.61 times smaller and
signicant. Recipient decision increases the odds of having greater care satisfaction,
when we consider the whole sample, but this e¤ect is not signicant, even after
introducing the caregiver and recipient characteristics as controls in Column(5). The
variables capturing the caring-time continues to be not signicant. We also interact
the care decision process variables with the informal caring-time, in such a way that
we capture the impact of the caring-time on the informal caregivers satisfaction,
when informal caregivers are obliged, by the family or by the care recipient, to
devote time to informal care activities (Column (3) and Column (6) with controls).
For those intensive caregivers, that is to say, those who engage in care for more than 5
hours per day, greater satisfaction is less likely than for those non-intensive caregivers,
when the informal caregiver devotes time to caregiver activities as a consequence of
a family decision, which conrms our theoretical hypothesis, (Figure 2). We show
that the odds of having greater care satisfaction compared to lower satisfaction are
0.55 times smaller, or 0.59 times smaller when we introduce the controls.18
17For consistency, we have also estimated with di¤erent sub-samples to correct for selection biases.
We consider that the selection bias may be generated by either age or frequency of the help. To
that end, we change the age range and we estimate only with those caregivers who devote time to
care activites every day. Results are consistent with those previously obtained and are available
upon request. We have not been able to use the Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the
Elderly (Encuesta de Apoyo Informal a los Mayores) 1994, since the informal caregiver satisfaction
question is not available.
18We have also repeated the analysis with di¤erent sub-samples, as in the previous section, and
we obtain similar results.
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However, in previous analyses we have ignored one important aspect which can
reduce the level of utility derived from care activities, that is to say, the trade-o¤
among labour, leisure and care activities. As we have explained in our theoretical
approach, the time devoted to informal care activities a¤ects positively the utility
derived from care activities by way of its impact on the care recipients ability to
perform activities of daily living. However, informal caregivers are time and budget
constrained, in such a way that an increase in the time devoted to informal care
may produce a decrease in both leisure time and in the time devoted to labour
activities. Thus, an increase in the time devoted to caring-time produces labour and
leisure costs. We have included these in our caregiver satisfaction estimation, and
introduced the possibility that the informal caregiver supports health costs which
have not previously been considered in the theoretical framework, but which can
a¤ect the utility derived from care activities (Columns from (7) to (12)). Surprisingly,
labour cost does not signicantly a¤ect the level of care satisfaction.19 However,
for those caregivers who incur leisure and health costs, the odds of having greater
satisfaction are about 0.78 and 0.62 times smaller, respectively, and signicant. The
results suggest that, if informal caregivers feel themselves to be less healthy, the
level of caregivers satisfaction decreases even more than the decrease in the level of
satisfaction produced by the leisure costs. These results are maintained for the other
variables. For those who report being engaged in care activities by way of a family
decision, the odds of having greater satisfaction are smaller, and are even lower for
those intensive caregivers who spend more than ve hours engaged in care and are
obliged by a family decision (Columns (9) and (12)).20
7 Conclusions
This work rst studies the time caregivers spend on informal care, controlling for
how the care decision process takes place and, second, analyses how that a¤ects
the informal caregivers level of satisfaction. We develop a theoretical framework in
which we compare di¤erent care decision processes, since we hypothesize that they
can generate di¤erent caring-time solutions. We show that it is more likely that
informal caregivers must devote more time to care activities, when the obligation is
a result of the family or the recipient decision, than the caregiver would prefer. The
family decision signicantly increases the time spent on care by informal caregivers,
due to a possible monetary compensation, arising from changes in the fraction of
residual non-labour income allocated to the informal caregiver. The impact of the
care recipient decision may change, since if we only assume Pareto superior solutions,
no di¤erences appear between the caring-time determined by the care recipient, and
that determined by the informal caregiver. However, if informal caregivers accept
Pareto inferior solutions, the time that they must spend is considerably higher than
the time they spend when they decide on their own, or under a family decision.
We use Spanish data to estimate a multinomial logit model which allows us to
analyse the e¤ect that care decision processes have on the amount of caring-time.
As expected, under the family decision, it is more likely that the informal caregiver
will devote more time to informal care activities, which conrms our theoretical
hypotheses. The family decision has the greatest e¤ect on the choice of di¤erent
19The e¤ect of this variable changes when we restrict the sample to those informal caregivers of
working age, when the odds of having greater care satisfaction are smaller, but not signicant.
20The better-tting model is the one estimated in Column (11); since it is the model with the
smaller AIC and Akaikes information criterion, and the greater Pseudo-R2 and McFaddens Adj
R2. If we only compare the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), we conclude that the better-tting
model is that shown in Column (8); which includes the same variables as in Column (11), but does
not include the controls.
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amounts of caring-time, increasing the odds of devoting more hours to informal care
activities. The impact of the care recipient is not signicant in the dynamics of
informal caring-time.
Why do informal caregivers make these e¤orts? To design and evaluate formal
care policies, a greater understanding of the process by which family members come
to assume caring responsibilities is necessary, but the study of informal caregivers
satisfaction can also be a useful tool in designing policies, given that this analysis can
be a predictor of informal caregivers behaviour. Results show that, being obligated to
spend time on caring activities, by way of the family decision, decreases the probabil-
ity of greater satisfaction, since, in most cases, informal caregivers must spend more
time than they would prefer. The probability of greater satisfaction decreases more
for intensive caregivers. The same occurs if they report incurring leisure and health
costs. Therefore, one way to increase the satisfaction of informal caregivers who in-
cur health costs, which considerably decrease their level of satisfaction, consists of a
greater concern for these caregivers among policy makers.
The care decision process which decreases the probability of greater satisfaction
may not be Pareto inferior, since a decrease in the caregivers satisfaction derived
from care activities can be compensated by an increase in the utility that the caregiver
obtains from, for example, leisure time or their own private consumption. Policies
which attempt to increase the well-being of the informal caregiver may focus not
only on the utility derived from care activities, but also on the overall level of utility
achieved by the informal caregiver. The satisfaction measure used here only captures
the caregiverssatisfaction derived from care activities, which is the only information
available, and thus further research should be carry out on the level of utility achieved
by the informal caregiver.
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Appendix A. Second Stage Game
Care Recipient Decision
Non-Bargaining Solution
In the rst approach, we suppose that the potential caregivers decide separately
the private consumption, the labour supply and leisure time.21 Formally:
Max
Cmi;1lmi;1;hmi;1
Umi;1(Cmi;1; lmi;1; A1)
subject to
Cmi;1  Ymi + wmihmi;1
A1 = A1(A1;1(H1); A2;1(t1;1; t0;1))
Tmi;1 = lmi;1 + hmi;1 + ti;1
with i = 1; 2; where Ymi represents non-labour income, wmi is the wage rate,
hmi;1 indicates the hours spent in paid work, and Tmi;1 represents the total time the
agent mi can devote to care and non-care activities. We assume that the caregiver
is the agent m1, therefore t2;j is equal to zero.
The associated rst-order conditions imply that, at the equilibrium point, the
individuals marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between individual is leisure and
private consumption is equal to the wage rate:
@Umi;1=@lmi;1
@Umi;1=@Cmi;1
= wmi; i = 1; 2: (2)
Let l^mi;1 (wmi; Ymi; A1; Tmi;1) ; h^mi;1 (wmi; Ymi; A1; Tmi;1) and
C^mi;1 (wmi; Ymi; A1; Tmi;1) ; i = 1; 2, be the solution of this stage.
From the envelope theorem, and given that Tmi;1 = lmi;1 + hmi;1 + ti;1 and (2),
we may obtain in equilibrium that @h^m1;1@t1;1 < 0, that is to say, an increase in the
time devoted to care activities generates a decrease in the time devoted to labour
activities. Given that Tmi;1 = lmi;1 + hmi;1 + ti;1; and supposing that Tm1;1 is xed,
if @h^m1;1@t1;1 =  1, the leisure time does not change. However, when
@h^m1;1
@t1;1
<  1; we
can observe that @l^m1;1@t1;1 7 0, that is to say, an increase in the time devoted to care
activities can, or not, increase the time devoted to leisure.22
In this case, we have not considered a corner solution, that is to say, we do not
consider that the agent i does not devote time to the labour market, and thus it is
possible that this agent does not perceive the labour cost that the time devoted to
care activities can produce.
A Collective Approach
In the second approach, the caregiver can be the daughter of the disabled person,
and the other potential caregiver can be her husband. Considering the usual strategy
of collective models (Chiappori 1988, 1992), the decisions made by the household
are Pareto-e¢ cient. This is equivalent to assuming that household allocations are
determined as solutions to the problem:
21For instance, a mother and her daughter, who lives independently. Pezzin and Schone (1999,
2002) explain that when the recipient and the family members co-reside, their interactions are
cooperative, but when they live independently there is no bargaining solution for the game.
22For the non-caregiver, t1;1 does not a¤ect her time constraint. However, her utility functions
depend positively on that argument. Therefore, we can observe that an increase in the time devoted
to care activities, t1;1, can generate an increase in the time devoted to the labour market. That is
to say, given that the changes in her marginal utility of consumption, when the ability to perform
activities of her parent, weighted for her wage rate, is greater than the changes in her marginal
utility of leisure when the ability to perform activities of her parent changes, the time devoted to
market activities increases, which diminishes the time devoted to leisure.
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max
Cm1;1;lm1;1;Cm2;1;lm2;1
	(Cm1;1; lm1;1; Cm2;1; lm2;1; A1;) = Um1;1(Cm1;1; lm1;1; A1)+
+(1  )Um2;1(Cm2;1; lm2;1; A1) (3)
subject to
Cm1;1 + Cm2;1  Ym + wm2hm2;1 + wm1hm1;1
A1 = A1(A1;1(H1); A2;1(t1;1; t0;1))
Tm1;1 = lm1;1 + hm1;1 + t1;1
Tm2;1 = lm2;1 + hm2;1
where Ym1 + Ym2 = Ym; the overall budget constraint is represented by
Cm1;1 + Cm2;1  Ym + wm1 (Tm1;1   lm1;1   t1;1) + wm2 (Tm2;1   lm2;1)
We assume that 	 is a strictly concave function of (Cm1;1; lm1;1; Cm2;1; lm2;1) and
has separability properties. It is possible to obtain some marginal rates of substitution
which do not depend on ; that is, the Pareto weight (see Blundell et al., 2005).
It is possible to solve the household problem (3) as a two-stage process. At stage
1, both spouses agree in determining the distribution of the residual non-labour in-
come between them. At stage 2, both spouses choose their level of consumption,
leisure time, and labour supply. Given that l^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) ;
h^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) and C^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) i =
1; 2 represent the solution of the household problem, we can dene mi as:
mi (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) = wmi l^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1)+
+C^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) + wmi(ti;1   Tmi;1); i = 1; 2:
where t2;1 = 0: We suppose that both agents are potential caregivers, but nally
there is only one caregiver, the agent m1, with m1 and m2 representing the sharing
rule, which is the fraction of residual non-labour income allocated to the spouse mi.
Both spouses share what is left after private consumption. Hence mi can be positive
or negative. If we aggregate m1 and m2 :
m1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1)+m2 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) = Ym
The functions l^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1), C^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1)
and h^mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) can be obtained from the following max-
imization problem:
max
Cmi;1;lmi;1;hmi;1
Umi;1(Cmi;1; lmi;1; A1)
subject to
Cmi;1  mi (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) + wmihmi;1
A1 = A1(A1;1(H1); A2;1(t1;1; t0;1))
Tmi;1 = lmi;1 + hmi;1 + ti;1
with i = 1; 2. Therefore, the overall budget constraint is
Cmi;1  mi (wm1; wm2; Ym; A1; Tm1;1; Tm2;1) + wmi (Tmi;1   lmi;1   ti;1)
The rst-order conditions imply that the individuals marginal rate of substitution
between individual is leisure and private consumption is equal to the wage rate in
equilibrium. We study the e¤ects that an increase in t1;1 has on both the hours spent
in market work and the leisure time for both members of the family, obtaining results
similar to those found in the non-bargaining solution. However, the changes in the
labour supply when caring-time changes also depend on the changes produced in the
sharing rule. Given @m1@t1;1 > 0; an increase in the time devoted to informal care can
generate labour cost, @h^m1;1@t1;1 < 0; under the same conditions as in the non-bargaining
solution. For leisure time, and given that Tmi;1 = lmi;1 + hmi;1 + ti;1; we observe
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similar results as in the non-bargaining solution. We also see that the impact of
t1;1 on h^mi;1 is more likely to be greater, that is to say, the changes in the labour
supply are more likely to be greater than in the non-bargaining solution, which is not
conditioned on the changes in the sharing rule. When the fraction of residual non-
labour income allocated to the informal caregiver m1; m1; considerably increases
when the time devoted to caring-time increases, that is, agent m2 compensates m1
for devoting time to care activities, we nd that the hours devoted to the labour
market decrease more than in the non-bargaining approach.23
Informal caregiver Decision and Family Decision
We now consider that the care recipient accepts the decision taken by the informal
caregiver, or the family decision, in the rst stage of the game. Therefore, t1;2 is xed,
which is determined in the rst stage of the game, although A2 is not xed.
Therefore, the care recipient decides the optimum amount of hours of formal
care and the level of her own private consumption. Assuming that n = 1, the care
recipient optimization problem is:
max
Cr;2;t0;2
Ur;2(Cr;2; A2)
subject to
A2 = A2(A1;2(H2); A2;2(t1;2; t0;2))
Cr;2 + Pt0;2  Yr;2
t1;2 + t0;2 = Tr;2
with Tr;2 being the total time needed to perform daily living activities, and P the
price of the formal care, which we assume equal to one. Given that t1;2 is xed, and
that Tr;2 is also xed, from t1;2 + t0;2 = Tr;2; we can easily obtain t0;2; that is, the
formal caring-time in equilibrium. It is straightforward to obtain the level of private
consumption in equilibrium, from the budget constraint, Cr;2: Therefore, there is no
maximization process due to the constraint exhibited by t1;2: It is more likely that
the levels of Cr;2 and t0;2 are not the optimum solution for the maximization problem
of the disabled person.
Appendix B. First Stage Game
Care Recipient Decision
In this game, it is the care recipient who decides the hours of informal and formal
care, with this choice being based on the recipients maximization problem:
max
Cr;1;t0;1;t1;1
Ur;1(Cr;1; A1)
subject to
A1 = A1(A1;1(H1); A2;1(t1;1; t0;1))
Cr;1 + t0;1  Yr;1
t1;1 + t0;1 = Tr;1
From the rst order condition, we obtain:
@Ur;1
@Cr;1
=
@Ur;1
@A1

@A1
@t1;1
  @A1
@t0;1

(4)
23For the non-caregiver, and given that t1;1 does not a¤ect his time constraint. However, his
utility function depends positively on this argument. Therefore, we can observe that an increase in
the time devoted to care activities t1;1 can generate an increase in the time devoted to the labour
market, depending on the sign of the relationship between the sharing rule and the caring-time. If
this relationship is positive, and given that the changes in his marginal utility of consumption when
the ability to perform activities of the disabled person, weighted for his wage rate, is greater than
the changes in his marginal utility of leisure when A1 changes. This produces an increase in the
time devoted to market activities, which diminishes the time devoted to leisure.
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At the equilibrium point, the individuals marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and the care recipients ability to perform activities of daily living is
equal to the di¤erence between the changes produced in the ability to perform activ-
ities of daily living of the care recipient, when the informal caring-time changes and
the changes produced in the same ability when the formal caring-time changes.
From here, and given the time and budget constraints, we can determine the
functions of t^1;1 (Tr;1; Yr;1;H1) ; C^r;1 (Tr;1; Yr;1;H1) ; and t^0;1 (Tr;1; Yr;1;H1) :
Informal caregiver Decision - A Non-Bargaining Solution
In the second game, the caregiver decides the hours to devote to care activities
by herself. We maintain the assumption that even though both agents are poten-
tial caregivers, only one is going to be the caregiver, in our case agent m1. The
maximization problem for each agent mi is represented by:
Max
Cmi;2lmi;2;hmi;2;ti;2
Umi;2(Cmi;2; lmi;2; A2)
subject to
Cmi;2  Ymi + wmihmi;2
A2 = A2(A1;2(H1); A2;2(t1;2; t0;2))
Tmi;2 = lmi;2 + hmi;2 + ti;2
with i = 1; 2; t2;j is equal to zero.24
For the non-caregiver, we obtain similar behaviour to process 1, in the non-
bargaining approach. Therefore, the behaviour of the non-caregiver is not conditioned
by the stage of participation.
The informal caregiver decides individually the private consumption, the labour
supply, the leisure time and the informal caring-time. From the rst order condition,
and using the envelope theorem, we observe:
@Umi;2=@lmi;2
@Umi;2=@Cmi;2
= wmi; i = 1; 2: (5)
and:
@Um1;2
@Cm1;2
wm1 =
@Um1;2
@A2
@A2
@t1;2
(6)
Let Cmi;2 (wmi; Ymi; t0;2;H2; Tmi;2) ; lmi;2 (wmi; Ymi; t0;2;H2; Tmi;2) ;
hmi;2 (wmi; Ymi; t0;2;H2; Tmi;2)and t1;2 (wmi; Ymi; t0;2;H2; Tmi;2) be the solutions of
the above maximization problem.
Family Decision - Collective Approach
In the third game, we model the family decision as an intra-family bargaining
model, following the collective approach (Chiappori, 1988, 1992), since this takes
into account the intra-family allocation of resources.
As we have explained above, in the collective approach, allocations are determined
by solving the following maximization problem:
max
Cm1;3;lm1;3;Cm2;3;lm2;3;t1;3
	(Cm1;3; lm1;3; Cm2;3; lm2;3; t1;3;) = Um1;3(Cm1;3; lm1;3; A3)+
+(1  )Um2;3(Cm2;3; lm2;3; A3) (7)
24For example, a mother, agent m1, who decides for herself to care for her disabled husband, and
the other member of the family is represented by her daughter.
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where Ym1 + Ym2 = Ym; subject to the overall budget constraint and the ability
of the care recipient to perform daily living activities:
Cm1;3 + Cm2;3  Ym + wm1 (Tm1;3   lm1;3   t1;3) + wm2 (Tm2;3   lm2;3)
A3 = A3(A1;3(H3); A2;3(t1;3; t0;3))
The solution of the household problem can be obtained using a two-stage process.
First, we determine the distribution of the residual non-labour income, mi:
mi (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3) = wmil

mi;1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3)+
+Cmi;3 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3) + wmi( Tmi;3); i = 1; 2:
with lmi;3 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3) ; h

mi;3 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3)
and Cmi;3 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3) ; i = 1; 2 indicating the solution of the
household problem.
Aggregating m1 and m2; we obtain:
 = m1 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3)+m2 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3) =
= Ym   wm3t1;3 (wm1; wm2; Ym; t0;3;H3; Tm1;3; Tm2;3)
Second, both spouses choose their level of consumption, leisure time, and labour
supply. As Blundell et al. (2005) show, we can obtain the optimum values of m1; m2
and t1;3 solving:
max
m1;m2;t1;3
Vm1 (wm1; m1; t1;3) + (1  )Vm2 (wm2; m2; t1;3)
subject to
m1 + m2 = Ym   wm1t1;3
with Vmi (wmi; mi; t1;3) being the individual indirect utilities.
The solution gives:
@Vm1
@t1;3
@Vm1
@
+
@Vm2
@t1;3
@Vm2
@
=
wm1
@Vm1
@m1
@Vm1
@
(8)
The aggregate individual marginal willingness of agent m1 to devote time to
care is equal to the marginal willingness to increase the distribution of the residual
non-labour income of agent m1; weighted by the wage rate of agent m1:
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
All Caring-Time < 2 Caring-Time 3  5 Caring-Time > 5
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Caregiver Demographic Characteristics
Age 52.604 (13.723) 46.958 (12.931) 49.411 (12.997) 55.324 (13.500)
Female 0.852 (0.356) 0.816 (0.389) 0.914 (0.280) 0.836 (0.371)
Illiterate 0.140 (0.347) 0.026 (0.160) 0.079 (0.270) 0.194 (0.396)
Low Education 0.403 (0.491) 0.326 (0.470) 0.435 (0.497) 0.410 (0.492)
Medium Education 0.373 (0.484) 0.489 (0.501) 0.394 (0.489) 0.335 (0.472)
High Education 0.084 (0.277) 0.158 (0.366) 0.092 (0.290) 0.061 (0.240)
Homemaker 0.457 (0.498) 0.284 (0.452) 0.462 (0.499) 0.499 (0.500)
Employed 0.282 (0.450) 0.453 (0.499) 0.363 (0.482) 0.206 (0.405)
Spouse 0.147 (0.354) 0.058 (0.234) 0.072 (0.259) 0.199 (0.400)
Son/Daughter 0.594 (0.491) 0.568 (0.497) 0.582 (0.494) 0.605 (0.489)
Married 0.774 (0.419) 0.742 (0.439) 0.788 (0.410) 0.776 (0.417)
< 10000 Inhabitants 0.180 (0.385) 0.153 (0.361) 0.154 (0.362) 0.198 (0.399)
10000  100000 Inhabitants 0.340 (0.474) 0.274 (0.447) 0.353 (0.479) 0.353 (0.478)
> 100; 000 Inhabitants 0.479 (0.500) 0.574 (0.452) 0.493 (0.501) 0.449 (0.498)
N Children 0.981 (1.023) 1.337 (1.142) 1.154 (1.036) 0.821 (0.950)
Recipient Demographic Characteristics
Age 80.493 (8.235) 79.037 (7.884) 80.596 (7.631) 80.828 (8.519)
Female 0.701 (0.458) 0.737 (0.442) 0.688 (0.464) 0.696 (0.460)
Illiterate 0.579 (0.494) 0.442 (0.498) 0.534 (0.500) 0.632 (0.483)
Low Education 0.363 (0.481) 0.463 (0.500) 0.394 (0.489) 0.326 (0.469)
Medium Education 0.037 (0.189) 0.047 (0.213) 0.041 (0.199) 0.033 (0.178)
High Education 0.021 (0.142) 0.047 (0.213) 0.031 (0.173) 0.009 (0.097)
Poor Health Status 0.954 (0.209) 0.953 (0.213) 0.925 (0.264) 0.966 (0.181)
Pension 0.926 (0.262) 0.911 (0.286) 0.911 (0.285) 0.936 (0.245)
Married 0.331 (0.471) 0.326 (0.470) 0.305 (0.461) 0.343 (0.475)
Help and Decision Variables
Caring-time < 2 hours 0.156 (0.363)
Caring-time 3  5 hours 0.240 (0.427)
Caring-time> 5 hours 0.605 (0.489)
IADL 0.966 (0.182) 0.932 (0.253) 0.993 (0.083) 0.963 (0.188)
ADL 0.742 (0.437) 0.516 (0.501) 0.682 (0.467) 0.825 (0.380)
Primary Caregiver 0.825 (0.380) 0.621 (0.486) 0.753 (0.432) 0.906 (0.292)
Permanent Help 0.752 (0.432) 0.716 (0.452) 0.658 (0.475) 0.799 (0.401)
Frequency 0.035 (0.185) 0.063 (0.244) 0.024 (0.153) 0.033 (0.178)
Relative Cohabitation 0.561 (0.496) 0.253 (0.436) 0.387 (0.488) 0.710 (0.454)
Travel Time 9.441 (31.345) 13.426 (20.704) 13.079 (27.975) 6.973 (34.511)
Monetary Compensation 0.322 (0.468) 0.268 (0.444) 0.298 (0.458) 0.346 (0.476)
Formal Help 0.163 (0.370) 0.237 (0.426) 0.158 (0.365) 0.147 (0.354)
Family Member Help 0.512 (0.500) 0.416 (0.494) 0.510 (0.501) 0.537 (0.499)
Caregiver Decision 0.619 (0.486) 0.663 (0.474) 0.654 (0.476) 0.594 (0.491)
Family Decision 0.325 (0.469) 0.253 (0.436) 0.291 (0.455) 0.357 (0.479)
Recipient Decision 0.056 (0.230) 0.084 (0.278) 0.055 (0.228) 0.049 (0.216)
Observations 1219 190 292 737
Source: Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly (IMSERSO).
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Table 5: Average Absolute Change in the Probability of Choosing Dif-
ferent Amounts of Caring-Time1;2;3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recipient Demographic Characteristics
Age 0.2886 0.2906
Age Recipient < 65 0.4480
Age Recipient 65  80 0.6593
Age Recipient > 80 0.6639
Age Recipient Square 0.2823 0.2844 0.3265
Female 0.0358 0.0351 0.0363
Illiterate 0.0911 0.0924 0.0899
Low Education 0.0411 0.0414 0.0402
Married 0.0076 0.0076 0.0088
Poor Health Status 0.0739* 0.0731* 0.0704*
Pension 0.0750 0.0751 0.0771
Caregiver Demographic Characteristics
Age 0.0290 0.0299 0.0316 0.0290
Age Square 0.0313 0.0330 0.0356 0.0303
Female 0.0655** 0.0624** 0.0625** 0.0614**
Medium Education 0.0309* 0.0299 0.0299 0.0299
High Education 0.0585* 0.0446* 0.0455* 0.0468*
Married 0.0244 0.0195 0.0178 0.0179
N Children 0.0180 0.0183 0.0182 0.0186
< 10000 Inhabitants 0.0288 0.0177 0.0176 0.0180
10000  100000 Inhabitants 0.0194 0.0139 0.0155 0.0149
Homemaker 0.0475** 0.0482** 0.0493** 0.0490**
Employed 0.0984*** 0.0852** 0.0920** 0.0853**
Help and Decision Variables
Instrumental Activities (IADL) 0.1476*** 0.1475*** 0.1478*** 0.1473***
Personal Activities (ADL) 0.1328*** 0.1280*** 0.1288*** 0.1280***
Primary Caregiver 0.1439*** 0.1408*** 0.1413*** 0.1407***
Permanent Help 0.0520*** 0.0508*** 0.0508*** 0.0499***
Frequency 0.1253** 0.1210** 0.1250** 0.1209**
Relative Cohabitation 0.2083*** 0.2026*** 0.2044*** 0.2030***
Travel Time 0.0113 0.0119 0.0122 0.0114
Spouse 0.0660 0.0831 0.0826 0.0852
Son/Daughter 0.0549* 0.0596* 0.0608* 0.0601*
Monetary Compensation 0.0142 0.0162 0.0158 0.0162
Formal Help 0.0087 0.0070 0.0067 0.0053
Family Member Help 0.0392* 0.0385* 0.0372* 0.0388*
Family Decision 0.0821*** 0.0758*** 0.0652** 0.0759***
Recipient Decision 0.0445 0.0450 0.0637 0.0433
Work x Family Decision 0.0307
Work x Recipient Decision 0.0709
Observations 1219 1219 1219 1219
Pseudo-R2 0.1771 0.1870 0.1883 0.1882
McFaddens Adj R2 0.127 0.132 0.125 0.125
BIC -6323 -6414 -6297 -6297
Notes: 1 Source: Spanish Survey of Informal Assistance for the Elderly (IMSERSO). 2 For binary
variables, it is computed the average of the absolute values of the discrete changes across all the
outcome categories. For the rest of the variables, we have computed the average absolute change of
one standard deviation centered on the base values. 3 The hypothesis that xi does not a¤ect the
dependent variable is tested here, H0 : i;1jb = ::: = i;Jjb where b is the base category. Because
i;bjb is necessarily 0; the hypothesis imposes constraints on J   1 parameters. This hypothesis is
tested with LR test. ***Signicant at the 1% level **Signicant at the 5% level *Signicant at the
10 % level
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Figure 3.1 Recipient Demographic Characteristics 
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Figure 3.2 Caregiver Demographic Characteristics 
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Figure 3.3 Help and Decision Variables 
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